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Abstract 
Malicious anchor nodes will constantly hinder genuine and appropriate localization. Discovering the malicious or vulnerable anchor node is an 
essential problem in wireless sensor networks (WSNs). In wireless sensor networks, anchor nodes are the nodes that know its current location. 
Neighboring nodes or non-anchor nodes calculate its location (or its location reference) with the help of anchor nodes. Ingenuous localization is 
not possible in the presence of a cheating anchor node or a cheating node. Nowadays, it’s a challenging task to identify the cheating anchor node 
or cheating node in a network. Even after finding out the location of the cheating anchor node, there is no assurance, that the identified node is 
legitimate or not. This paper aims to localize the cheating anchor nodes using trilateration algorithm and later associate it with maximum 
likelihood expectation technique (MLE), and Mahalanobis distance to obtain maximum accuracy in identifying malicious or cheating anchor 
nodes during localization. We were able to attain a considerable reduction in the error achieved during localization. For implementation purpose 
we simulated our scheme using ns-3 network simulator. 
Keywords: Maximum likelihood expectation, trilateration, mahalanobis distance,  anchor node, security, distance-based localization, wireless sensor networks. 
1. Introduction 
Wireless ad hoc and sensor networks are on a steady rise in the recent decade. This is because of their reduced cost in 
deployment and maintenance. Advancements in radio frequency spectrum also carved way for the improvement in the data rate 
for communication. Many devices belong to wireless ad hoc and sensor networks; one among them is anchor node [1 – 8]. Anchor 
nodes are the nodes that know its current location. Neighboring nodes or non-anchor nodes calculate its location (or location 
reference) with the help of anchor nodes, and its working is quite referable to Light House. 
The location of the nodes plays a significant role in many areas as routing, surveillance and monitoring, military etc. The 
sensor nodes must know their location reference to carryout location-based routing (LR) [9 – 12]. To find out the shortest route, 
the location aided routing (LAR) [13 – 15] makes use of the locality reference of the sensor nodes. In some industries the sensor 
nodes are used to identify minute changes as pressure, temperature and gas leak, and in military, robots are used to detect 
landmines where in both the cases location information plays a key part. 
Anchor nodes can also be used to find the current location of any device (mobile phones, objects and people). It does that by 
transmitting anchor frames periodically or at regular intervals. Usually anchor frames are used to advertise the occurrence of a 
wireless modem or an Access Point (AP). Each anchor frame carries some details about the configuration of AP and a little 
security information for the clients. 
When the technologies are on a massive upswing, the need for security of the relevant technologies arises. There can be several 
occasion where the anchor nodes can be vulnerable to security breach. Because of the security breach the anchor node starts 
cheating by providing false information. In the presence of cheating anchor nodes the chances of localization drastically 
decreases. Many papers [16 – 19] discuss about the localization of cheating anchor nodes, but with inconsistent accuracy. So, to 
overcome this, we localize the cheating or vulnerable anchor node using trilateration technique, and associate the results with 
maximum likelihood expectation technique [20, 32] and Mahalanobis distance [34]. No such scheme has been used till now to 
identify the malicious anchor nodes. 
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Organization of the paper – Section 2 provides the localization using trilateration algorithm and section 3 and section 4 
studies the maximum likelihood expectation and Mahalanobis distance, respectively. Simulation and results are covered in section 
5, section 6 explicates few future events and section 7 concludes the paper. 
2. Localization using Trilateration Algorithm 
Anchor nodes are widely used for tacking and localization; whereas now-a-days it is also used for navigation and route-
identification. With the help of anchor nodes, a user can find out his current location. Consider a scenario like a hotel or museum, 
there may be many occasions where people go out of track. This can be flabbergasted by installing anchor nodes installed in 
various locations, so that people can trace out there location very easily and it is possible only when the anchor nodes are 
authentic. Now-a-days hackers are on a rise; anybody can easily get into any system and change its settings. Similarly, they can 
hack any anchor nodes and change its location reference to some other false location reference, making people lose their track; 
thus leading to a bad imprint about the system (i.e., hotel, museum). 
An attack is exemplified in fig. 1 and fig. 2.  Fig. 1 shows the initial deployment of anchor nodes A1, A2, A3; with location 
reference (x1, y1), (x2, y2), (x3, y3); and distance L1, L2, L3; respectively, from the trilateration point T, having location reference 
(xt, yt). Fig. 2 demonstrates the logical deployment of anchor nodes after the attack i.e., multiple changes in location reference of 
anchor node A2. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Initial setup of anchor nodes. 
 
Fig. 2. Anchor nodes after attack. 
The three dimensional location coordinate of any device or node can be estimated using trilateration calculations. Trilateration 
technique uses distance measurements rather than angular measurements; latter technique is also used in many localization 
techniques [21 – 23]. Using some iterative schemes like least square, least median square [17], least trimmed square [24] and 
gradient descent [25], can equitably increase the accuracy of trilateration technique. 
Trilateration techniques use the distance measurement between the nodes to calculate the location reference. The distances 
between the nodes are identified using Received Signal Strength (RSSI) [26, 33] or Time of Arrival (ToA) [27, 28, 33] or Time 
Difference of Arrival (TDoA) [29, 30, 33]. When a node (requesting node) wants to identify its location information using 
trilateration technique, it does with the help of three or more neighboring anchor nodes.  The exemplification of trilateration 
techniques is as follows: 
a. A node that wants to find its location reference (or location coordinate) sends a localization request to any of its neighboring 
anchor nodes. The anchor node sends a reply with its current location reference and its RSSI measurement with respect to the 
node that wants to localize. Based on this information, we put up a virtual wireless ring (VWR) (or logical ring) [31] as shown 
in fig. 3. The assumption of the logical ring is made with the anchor node as center. The requesting node can be located 
anywhere on the circumference of the logical ring, and thus making it difficult to guess its exact location. 
b. Next the same requesting node sends another localization request to a different neighboring anchor node. The anchor node 
follows the same process as discussed in the previous step. Again another logical ring is updated to the previous one, shown in 
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fig. 4. From the logical observation we can analyze that the location of the requesting node could be present in any one of the 
intersecting point of the two logical rings. 
 
Fig. 3. Virtual wireless ring with one anchor node. 
 
Fig. 4. Virtual wireless ring with two anchor nodes. 
c. Finally to ease the muddle, the same requesting node sends another localization request to a different neighboring anchor node 
other than the previous two anchor nodes. The same process is repeated with the new neighboring anchor node. When the final 
virtual wireless ring is drawn, we would be able to extract the exact location of the requesting node. Fig. 5 shows the 
localization of a node using trilateration technique. 
 
Fig. 5. Virtual wireless ring with three anchor node. 
 
Fig. 6. Trilateration measurements. 
The mathematical computation of trilateration is as follows: 
Consider three circles or spheres with centre C1, C2 and C3, radius L1, L2 and L3 from points A1, A2 and A3 (anchor node location), 
refer fig. 6. 
The general equation of the sphere is  
∑(𝐴𝑘 − 𝐶𝑘)
2 = 𝐿2
3
𝑘=1
 
The three circles or spheres equation can be modified as follows, 
𝐿1
2 = 𝐴1
2 + 𝐴2
2 + 𝐴3
2     (1) 
𝐿2
2 = (𝐴1 − 𝐷)
2 + 𝐴2
2 + 𝐴3
2     (2) 
𝐿3
2 = (𝐴1 − 𝑖)
2 + (𝐴2 − 𝑗)
2 +  𝐴3
2   (3) 
Subtracting equation (2) from equation (1), we get 
𝐿2
2  −  𝐿1
2 = (𝐴1 − 𝐷)
2 + 𝐴2
2 + 𝐴3
2 − 𝐴1
2 − 𝐴2
2 − 𝐴3
2 (4) 
Substituting we get, 
𝐴1 = 
𝐿1
2  − 𝐿2
2+𝐷2
2𝐷
       (5) 
From the first two circles (C1 and C2) we can find out that the two circles intersect at two different points, that is  
𝐷 − 𝐴1 < 𝐴2 < 𝐷 + 𝐴1     (6) 
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Substituting equation (5) in equation (1), we can procure  
𝐿1
2 = (
𝐿1
2  − 𝐿2
2+𝐷2
2𝐷
)
2
 +  𝐴2
2 + 𝐴3
2    (7) 
Substituting we get the solution of the intersection of two circles 
𝐴2
2 + 𝐴3
2 = 𝐿1
2 − 
(𝐿1
2  − 𝐿2
2+𝐷2)2
4𝐷2
    (8) 
Substituting equation (1) with equation (3), we get  
𝐿3
2 = (𝐴1 − 𝑖)
2 + (𝐴2 − 𝑗)
2 +  𝐿1
2 − 𝐴1
2 − 𝐴2
2   (9) 
𝐴2 =  
𝐿1
2 − 𝐿2
2 − 𝐴1
2 + (𝐴1
2 − 𝑖)2 + 𝑗2
2𝑗
 
                                                  =  
𝐿1
2 − 𝐿2
2 + 𝑖2  +  𝑗2
2𝑗
 
𝐴2 = 
𝑖
𝑗
 𝐿1       (10) 
From equation (5) and equation (10) we get the values of B1 and B2 respectively. From that we can find out the value of A3 from 
equation (1), 
𝐴3 =  ±√𝐿1
2 − 𝐴1
2 − 𝐴2
2 
From the above equation we can say that, A3 can have either positive or negative value. If any circles intersect any other two 
circles precisely at one point, then A3 will get a value zero. If it intersects at two or more points, outside or inside it can get either 
a positive or a negative value. 
During deployment each node carries out the trilateration process with all of its neighbouring nodes and every node is 
authorized with two or more trilateration points for security reasons. Every node reveals the information about its trilateration 
point to its immediate or one hop neighbours. Care is taken that no node reveals the trilateration information about its neighbours. 
The algorithm for setting up the anchor nodes according to trilateration are as follows, 
1. Start 
2. { 
3. Deploy the anchor nodes 
4. { 
5.  Set the initial coordinates (latitude & longitude) for each anchor node 
6.  Cluster anchor nodes into a set of three or more 
7. } 
8.  Trilaterate a group of anchor nodes to a centre point (or trilateration point) and save the location reference in 
 M1* 
9.  Individually trilaterate all the anchor nodes with the neighbouring group and save the location references in 
 M2*, M3*, etc. 
10.  Pass trilateration information to its immediate neighbours 
11.  Repeat the above steps for all the anchor nodes 
12. } 
13. End 
(* M1, M2, M3, etc., are different memory with different location reference) 
The algorithm for finding out the malicious anchor nodes are as follows, 
1. Start 
2. { 
3. Trilaterate each group of anchor nodes to a centre point and save that location 
4. { 
5.  Compare the obtained location with location reference (M1) 
6.  If comparison not satisfied 
7.  { 
8.   Trilaterate all anchor nodes (individually) of the particular group (which does not satisfy the above 
  comparison) with the neighbouring group (using the trilateration information obtained during  
  deployment) 
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9.   Compare the obtained results with the location references (M2, M3, etc.) 
10.   { 
11.    Separate the mismatched anchors node location and save the new location in Mn  
12.   } 
13.  } 
14.  If comparison satisfied, no cheating nodes occur 
15. } 
16. End 
After the comparison, the anchor nodes that does not have the same location reference or the anchor node that tends to be 
vulnerable is considered to be malicious or cheating node. To confirm its adversary, we compare it with maximum likelihood 
expectation and Mahalanobis distance. 
3. Associating with Maximum Likelihood Expectation 
One of the most broadly and commonly used classification technique is maximum likelihood expectation / classification. It has 
a good acceptable result and is extensively employed and demanding algorithm. 
The localization error obtained during the above mentioned algorithm is discussed in our next section. And the obtained results 
are compared with maximum likelihood expectation method. In wireless sensor networks, all the sensor data or the sensed data are 
sent to a central server or aggregation point. In our scheme, the central server is made available with the location references of all 
the nodes in the network and MLE method is carried out with the location references available in the aggregation point or the 
central server. 
Maximum likelihood Expectation is a technique that is used in statistics to find the maximum probable value from previously 
obtained results. The results obtained from maximum likelihood expectation can be used as the parametric values for further 
experiments or simulations.  
A. Probability density function 
Probability density function (pdf) sorts out the required area for the random variable to occur. Consider a random sample (x1, 
x2, …, xn) from an unknown population has data vector x = (x1, x2, …, xn). The probability density function f(x|w) is 
𝑓(𝑥 =  (𝑥1, 𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑛 )|𝑤) = 𝑓1(𝑥1|𝑤) ∗ 𝑓2(𝑥2|𝑤) ∗ … ∗ 𝑓𝑛(𝑥𝑛|𝑤) 
where: 
x is a random sample, 
w is the parameter value. 
Consider a scenario where n (number of trials) = 10, w = 0.4 and x = (0, 1, …, 10), then the probability density function will be  
𝑓(𝑥 | 𝑛 = 10, 𝑤 = 0.4 ) =  
10!
𝑥! (10 − 𝑥!)
(0.4)𝑥(0.6)10−𝑥 
The parametric values have a large number of successive probabilities. 
B. Likelihood function 
The trilateration groups are denoted as 𝜑𝑘 , 𝑘 = 1, 2, 3, … ,𝑀 where 𝑀 is the number of trilateration groups. To determine the 
group, to which an anchor node with the current location 𝒛 belongs, the conditional probabilities 
𝑝(𝜑𝑘|𝒛), 𝑘 = 1, 2, 3, … ,𝑀 
play a crucial role. The probability 𝑝(𝜑𝑘|𝑧) states whether 𝜑𝑘 is the correct trilateration group of the anchor node with the give 
location 𝑧. We can categorize the anchor nodes, if we know the complete set of 𝑝(𝜑𝑘|𝒛) from decision rule 
𝒛 ∈  𝜑𝑘  if 𝑝(𝜑𝑘|𝒛) >  𝑝(𝜑𝑛|𝒛) for all 𝑛 ≠ 𝑘  (11) 
This explains that the anchor node with location 𝒛 is the member of group 𝜑𝑘 if 𝑝(𝜑𝑘|𝒛) is the largest probability of the set. 
The desired 𝑝(𝜑𝑘|𝒛) from the above equation and the available 𝑝(𝒛|𝜑𝑘) from the projected training data, are correlated by 
Bayes theorem 
𝑝(𝜑𝑘|𝒛) =  
𝑝(𝒛|𝜑𝑘) 𝑝(𝜑𝑘)
𝑝(𝒛)
 
(12) 
where: 
(𝜑𝑘) is the probability that anchor nodes from group 𝜑𝑘 can move its location, 
𝑝(𝒛) is the probability of finalizing an anchor node with location reference 𝒛. 
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𝑝(𝒛) =  ∑ 𝑝(𝒛|𝜑𝑘) 𝑝(𝜑𝑘)
𝑀
𝑘=1
 
Replacing equation (12) in (11), reduces the decision rule to 
𝒛 ∈  𝜑𝑘  if 𝑝(𝒛|𝜑𝑘)𝑝(𝜑𝑘) >  𝑝(𝒛|𝜑𝑛)𝑝(𝜑𝑛) for all 𝑛 ≠ 𝑘  (13) 
In equation (13), 𝑝(𝒛) has been eliminated as a shared factor, since we don’t know whether it correct location or false location. 
As 𝑝(𝒛|𝜑𝑘) can be obtained from the training data, and it is plausible that the priors 𝑝(𝜑𝑘) can be estimated. 
In order to prove mathematically, we define the discriminant function 
ᵹ𝑘(𝒛) =  ln{𝑝(𝒛|𝜑𝑘)𝑝(𝜑𝑘)} =  ln 𝑝(𝒛|𝜑𝑘) +  ln 𝑝(𝜑𝑘)  (14) 
In order to get a decision rule by substituting equation (14) with equation (13), we need a monotonic function i.e., natural 
logarithm. We give the decision rule as 
 𝒛 ∈  𝜑𝑘  if ᵹ𝑘(𝒛) >  ᵹ𝑗(𝒛) for all 𝑛 ≠ 𝑘 (15) 
To further proceed with maximum likelihood estimation, a certain probability model is chosen for the trilateration group 
function 𝑝(𝒛|𝜑𝑘). In our scheme, we used Gaussian distribution which is as follows: 
𝑝(𝒛|𝜑𝑘) =  (2𝜋)
−𝑆 2⁄  |𝐶𝑖|
−1 2⁄  𝑒−1 2⁄  (𝒛− ?̅?𝑖)
𝑇 𝐶𝑖
−1 (𝒛− ?̅?𝑖) (16) 
where: 
?̅?𝑖 is the mean position of the anchor node among the trilateration group 𝜑𝑘, 
𝐶𝑖 is the covariance matrix of the trilateration group 𝜑𝑘, 
𝑆 is the ‘N’ dimensional space. 
To obtain the categorization function, substitute equation (16) with (14) 
ᵹ𝑘(𝒛) =  
−1
2
 𝑆 ln 2𝜋 − 
1
2
 ln|𝐶𝑖| −  
1
2
 (𝒛 − ?̅?𝑖)
𝑇 𝐶𝑖
−1 (𝒛 −  ?̅?𝑖)  +  ln 𝑝(𝜑𝑘) 
Simplifying we get, 
ᵹ𝑘(𝒛) =  ln 𝑝(𝜑𝑘)  − 
1
2
 ln|𝐶𝑖|  − 
1
2
 (𝒛 − ?̅?𝑖)
𝑇 𝐶𝑖
−1 (𝒛 − ?̅?𝑖) 
Removing the prior probability gives us the trilateration group membership of the anchor node, 
ᵹ𝑘(𝒛) =  − ln|𝐶𝑖| − (𝒛 − ?̅?𝑖)
𝑇 𝐶𝑖
−1 (𝒛 −  ?̅?𝑖) (17) 
Equation (17) is used to identify whether the anchor node belongs to current trilateration group. If the anchor node does not 
belong to the group it is considered deceitful. Probability distribution function sorts out the most probable value, which leads for 
the estimation of expected value. 
4. Correlating with Mahalanobis Distance 
Mahalanobis distance applies posterior probability to identify the outliers. When two anchor nodes in space are demarcated by 
two or more associated location coordinates, Mahalanobis distance can be used to find the distance measure between the two 
anchor nodes. Mahalanobis distance identifies the malicious cheating nodes by comparing the location coordinates with respect to 
a centroid value. In our case the centroid value is the location coordinate of the trilateration point. The Mahalanobis distance 
function to identify the distance measure between two anchor nodes are as follows: 
𝑑(𝑚𝑎ℎ𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑠) =  {[(𝑥𝑗 , 𝑦𝑗) − (𝑥𝑖 , 𝑦𝑖)]
𝑇
∗  𝐶−1 ∗  [(𝑥𝑗 , 𝑦𝑗) − (𝑥𝑖 , 𝑦𝑖)] }
1/2
 
where: 
𝑑(𝑚𝑎ℎ𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑠) is the distance between two anchor nodes, 
(𝑥𝑖 , 𝑦𝑖) & (𝑥𝑗 , 𝑦𝑗) are the location coordinates of the two anchor nodes, 
𝐶 is the sample covariance matrix. 
The variance-covariance matrix 𝐶 is constructed in order to gauge Mahalanobis distance, 
𝐶 =  
1
(𝑛 − 1)
 [(𝑥, 𝑦)]𝑇 [(𝑥, 𝑦)] 
where: 
(𝑥, 𝑦) is the matrix containing the location coordinates, 
𝑛 is the number of nodes. 
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In the instance of multiple location references the variance-covariance will become as follows: 
𝐶 =  [
𝜎1
2 (𝑥𝑖 , 𝑦𝑖) 𝜌12 𝜎1 (𝑥𝑖 , 𝑦𝑖) 𝜎2 (𝑥𝑗 , 𝑦𝑗) 
𝜌12 𝜎1 (𝑥𝑖 , 𝑦𝑖) 𝜎2 (𝑥𝑗 , 𝑦𝑗) 𝜎2
2 (𝑥𝑗 , 𝑦𝑗)
] 
where: 
𝜎1
2 & 𝜎2
2 are the variances of the multiple location references, 
𝜌12 𝜎1 (𝑥𝑖 , 𝑦𝑖) 𝜎2 (𝑥𝑗 , 𝑦𝑗) is the covariance between the multiple location references. 
The value of 𝐶−1 is computed as follows: 
𝐶−1 = 
[
 
 
 
 
𝜎2
2 (𝑥𝑗 , 𝑦𝑖)
|𝐶|
− 𝜌12 𝜎1 (𝑥𝑖 , 𝑦𝑖) 𝜎2 (𝑥𝑗 , 𝑦𝑗)
|𝐶|
− 𝜌12 𝜎1 (𝑥𝑖 , 𝑦𝑖) 𝜎2 (𝑥𝑗 , 𝑦𝑗)
|𝐶|
𝜎1
2 (𝑥𝑗 , 𝑦𝑗)
|𝐶| ]
 
 
 
 
 
where: 
|𝐶| is the variance covariance matrix’s determinant and is equal to 𝜎1
2 𝜎2
2 (1 − 𝜌12
2 ). 
The transformation of the location coordinates to matrix form is shown in fig. 7a, b. The Mahalanobis distance function can be 
modified to identify the distances between multiple location coordinates to a centroid, as follows: 
𝑑(𝛿𝑖) =  {[(𝑥𝑖 , 𝑦𝑖) − (𝑥𝑐 , 𝑦𝑐)]
𝑇 ∗  𝐶−1 ∗  [(𝑥𝑖 , 𝑦𝑖) − (𝑥𝑐 , 𝑦𝑐)] }
1/2 for 𝑖 = 1, 2, … , 𝑛 
where: 
𝑑(𝛿𝑖) is the distance between centroid and 𝑖
𝑡ℎ anchor node, 
(𝑥𝑖 , 𝑦𝑖) is the location coordinate of the 𝑖
𝑡ℎ anchor node, 
(𝑥𝑐 , 𝑦𝑐) is the location coordinate of the centroid or trilateration point. 
The new distances obtained using Mahalanobis distance, are compared using posterior probability; leading to the confirmation 
of the anchor nodes adversity. The distances obtained using this method is marginally accurate than the previous method. 
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Fig. 7. Transforming location coordinates to matrix representation. 
5. Simulation and Results 
Our simulation was carried out in 600m x 600m two dimensional environment. Deploying the anchor node accurately is very 
important. First three anchor nodes were placed randomly and the trilateration point is found for the same. An anchor node is 
placed on the trilateration point attained. Any one of the first three nodes is selected and it acts as the trilateration point of the 
newer nodes that are going to be deployed. The above process is repeated until the final node is deployed. We deployed around 
117 nodes (around 1 node for every 5m x 5m), spread randomly using the above method. Fig. 8 shows the deployment of the 
anchor nodes in our scenario. 
Jeril Kuriakose, et.al. 
256 
 
 
Fig. 8. Deployment of anchor nodes 
.  
Fig. 9. Mean localization error while using trilateration 
 
A. Experiment using trilateration technique 
Few anchor nodes were compromised (making it transmit false information regarding its current location) randomly and the 
malicious anchor nodes were found out using trilateration technique. The localization error transpired while localizing the 
malicious anchor nodes from random samples, were noted down. Each simulation was carried out for 50 times and the mean error 
was considered. Fig. 9 shows the mean error in location discovery and fig. 10 shows the time taken to locate the malicious anchor 
nodes during simulation. 
 
Fig. 10. Average time for simulation. 
 
Fig. 11. Mean error after comparing with Mahalanobis distance. 
B. Comparing with Mahalanobis distance 
The central server or aggregation point has a list of initial location references of the anchor nodes. The false location of the 
malicious anchor nodes obtained, were compared with the results obtained from Mahalanobis distance. Comparing the results 
obtained, reduced the error in location discovery. Fig. 11 shows the mean error in locating malicious anchor nodes. 
C. Comparing with Maximum Likelihood Expectation 
Maximum likelihood function has a list of initial location references of the anchor nodes. The false location of the malicious 
anchor nodes obtained, were compared with the results obtained from maximum likelihood function. Comparing the results 
obtained, reduced the error in location discovery. Fig. 12 shows the mean error in locating malicious anchor nodes while using 
maximum likelihood expectation. Fig. 13 shows the comparison of the two results, trilateration and trilateration with MLE. 
257 
 
Finally the information about the malicious anchor node is conveyed to all the nodes other than the infected nodes, and the routing 
table is updated by confiscating the malicious anchor node. 
 
Fig. 12. Mean error after comparing with maximum likelihood function. 
 
Fig. 13. Result comparison. 
6. Discussion and Future Events 
Malicious anchor nodes will constantly hinder genuine and appropriate localization. Our scheme was carried out using fixed 
sensor nodes and the attack has a permanent consequence in the sensor node. Reducing the localization error and endorsing the 
malicious anchor node were implemented successfully in this paper. We have proposed a novel scheme using maximum 
likelihood and trilateration technique to identify malicious anchor nodes. The error can be increased if hindrance, interferences, 
and attenuation caused by signal fading, and noise are additional. Our scheme can also be modelled to overcome such 
disturbances by using some statistical distributions like Rayleigh or Rician distributions [34]. Our algorithm performed 
consistently for different topologies. 
Our scheme can be extended for mobile sensor node with an intermittent attack type. Our framework can be extended to 
acoustic and ultra-wideband (UWB) technology. Using energy efficiency as a benchmark is quite challenging. Our algorithm was 
implemented in 2-D plane and can be extended to 3-D plane also. 
7. Conclusion 
For smart environments, security plays a very essential part. In this paper, we discussed about localizing malicious anchor 
nodes in a secured manner, using trilateration technique and comparing the results obtained with maximum likelihood expectation 
and Mahalanobis distance. By both the techniques way we were able to reduce the error attained during localization. However, 
maximum likelihood expectation outperformed Mahalanobis distance in perceiving cheating beacon nodes. By using maximum 
likelihood expectation and Mahalanobis distance we can obtain consistent and proficient results. Our results show that as the 
malicious anchor nodes increases, the simulation time and error obtained during location discovery slightly increases. The 
accuracy obtained in our work can be used as assistance in some wireless applications. Some imminent events for further research 
have been discussed. 
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